Hizbollah - Special Force 2

Bashar alAssads troops are on a collision course with Western special forces, after advancing towards their training base in eastern Syria over the weekend. SpecWarNet. net Worldwide directory of special forces and government agencies Your Online Source for info on Special Warfare and counterterrorism Units Latest breaking news, including politics, crime and celebrity. Find stories, updates and expert opinion. HizbollahL_468x312.jpg' alt='Hizbollah - Special Force 2' title='Hizbollah - Special Force 2' />Iraqi forces have liberated Tal Afar, an Isis stronghold in the northwest of the country, after just a week of fighting for the city, the military said on Sunday. Coming Soon Potassium The Crystal of Life Itself Coming Soon. Back in early December I was taken seriously ill with what was diagnosed as Acute Angina. National Gang Threat Assessment Emerging Trends view printable version pdf The gang estimates presented in the 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment NGTA. Syrian troops advance on US and UK special forces fighting ISIS World News. Government forces under the control of President Bashar al Assad are now within 1. Tanf, close to the Iraq border a heavily fortified centre for American and British special forces training Syrian rebel groups, which are fighting Islamic State ISIS. The Syrian ground advance is being led by Iranian forces, which are controlling Syrian troops along with Lebanese Hizbollah fighters and aided by Russian jets in the sky. The Syrian army is said to be concerned by two months of Free Syrian Army FSA advances against ISIS which allowed the rebels to secure a large swathe of sparsely populated territory stretching from the south east of Damascus all the way to the borders with Iraq and Jordan. Cakewalk Guitar Tracks 2.0 Free Download. Reuters. US troops stationed in Syria. Tanks and surface to air missiles have been moved closer to the eastern frontline by Syrian forces in recent days. Mozahem al Saloum, spokesman for the FSA brigade at the base, told the Telegraph The Iranians are the ones promoting their movement towards al Tanf, using the slogan Fighting The Grand Satan. US and the international coalition. The region is strategically important to the Syrian government as gaining control of the road to the Tanf base would create a land link with ally Iraq in the south. The route had been a major weapons supply route for Iranian weapons into Syria until ISIS seized large areas of the territory along the Iraq Syria border. The region is also important as Deir Ezzor, north of Tanf, is home to Syrias biggest oil deposit. While the US has sent a clear message any government advance towards their base will not be accepted it is unclear just how exactly they will respond to any outright provocation. Related articles. Getty. US forces based in Syria. Mr Saloum said if the unit came under threat, it would bring enemies together in order to stop the regime moving any further, referring to other factions of the FSA currently not co operating with one another. A recent deal signed in Kazakhstan to establish so called safe zones in four areas of Syria has effectively halted battles between the regime and rebels in the oppositions main strongholds of Idlib, Homs, Deraa and Aleppo. The halt of rebel activity in the most heavily contested areas in the north and centre of the country, coupled with the large scale surrender of opposition fighters in Damascus, has enabled government troops to move east. Getty. A US soldier on guard at a base in Syria. Hizbollah - Special Force 2' title='Hizbollah - Special Force 2' />The development came as government and opposition delegations met in Geneva for the sixth round of peace talks under the sponsorship of the United Nations. Efforts to end the war are now proceeding along two rival tracks the formal political process hosted at UN headquarters in Switzerland and, since January, parallel talks in the Kazakhstan capital, Astana, brokered by Russia, Iran and Turkey. Related articles. Fighting ISIS The Road to and beyond Raqqa. Executive Summary. When Hizbollah the Lebanese Party of God threw its fighters into Syria in 2. Had the Assad regime collapsed or been defeated by U. S. backed regional powers, it could have faced a hostile Sunni successor in Damascus and lost its essential arms channel from Iran. Today, its core objective of preserving the regime has been met, but there is no end in sight to the war. If Iran and Hizbollah continue to provide unconditional military support to the regime without a realistic exit strategy, they will be dragged deeper into what can only become a quagmire, even as their armed strength grows in the wider region. At the same time, they will have to contend with a potentially more hostile U. S. administration that has said it wants to push back Iranian influence even as it also pursues a more aggressive approach against the Islamic State IS, an enemy it has in common with Hizbollah and Iran. Avoiding being sucked into a quagmire requires negotiating a settlement that has buy in from key countries that back the opposition, as well as with Russia imposing the requisite compromises on Damascus. Bazooka Cafe Game. This report proposes preliminary steps Iran and Hizbollah could take in that direction, including recognising non jihadist rebels initiating talks with them on whatever common ground they can find lowering sectarian rhetoric and refraining from new offensives against opposition held areas so as to preserve a non jihadist foe capable of enforcing a deal, if and when one is reached. Hizbollah cannot change course in Syria without Irans agreement, yet pays high and mounting costs for its intervention. Once dependent on the late President Hafez Assads regime to protect its military status in Lebanon, it has become instrumental to the survival of his sons rule in Syria. Yet, alliance with the Assads has become a liability, draining resources, empowering the jihadist groups it has tried to vanquish and provoking hostility from much of the Syrian population and regional players such as Qatar and Hamas with which it once enjoyed good ties. A more difficult to measure cost is the harm to its image and self identity. From a party of the oppressed and a Lebanon based and centred resistance movement standing up to Israel, it has projected itself across the border and morphed into a powerful regional force. Once acclaimed by Arabs for struggle against a common enemy, most recently in the 2. Easyworship 6 Full Crack on this page. Lebanon war, it is widely viewed as a sectarian Shiite militia and, in parts of Syria, a ruthless occupier. Hizbollah long has given Iran strategic depth vis vis Israel. Escalating involvement in Syria has elevated it to an indispensable partner in a high stakes, increasingly sectarian tinged regional confrontation, whose principal exponents are Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hizbollah has benefitted from its intervention beyond regime survival. Its full throated effort to keep the regime alive helped consolidate it as Irans most effective partner. The war has displayed and deepened mutual dependence. Hizbollah long has given Iran strategic depth vis vis Israel. Escalating involvement in Syria has elevated it to an indispensable partner in a high stakes, increasingly sectarian tinged regional confrontation, whose principal exponents are Iran and Saudi Arabia. In turn, Iran gives arms and other support that allow Hizbollah to fight Israel and leverage military strength into political dominance in a country that always denied it to Shiites. Hizbollah has also gained from its relationship with Russia, which arose from the latters 2. It has been a vital partner on the ground, an elite fighting force without which Russian airstrikes would have been much less effective. It has been able to enhance its military and tactical expertise by a combat alliance, for the first time, with a global power. Yet, the relationship is fraught, as Moscow, a secular power wary of Islamist radicalism and favouring a strong Syrian state and army, has its own agenda in Syria, which is starting to diverge from Irans and Hizbollahs, now that the regimes immediate survival seems assured. Hizbollah has its own agenda, so needs its own political strategy. Along with most other players, it continues to bank on hard power. This can only prolong the conflict and encourage radicalisation on all sides. Defeat of non jihadist rebels would help swell jihadist ranks and remove a credible opponent that could negotiate a settlement and enforce a deal. Hizbollah may feel emboldened by Iranian and Russian support and their joint 2. Aleppo and favour efforts to gain more ground. Taking and holding territory in the face of a morphing insurgency and a hostile population will become increasingly costly in blood and treasure, however, and may prevent the party from extricating itself at all. To loosen the trap and create the possibility of an eventual drawdown, Hizbollah, together with Iran, should urgently take steps to lower tensions. As part of the process Russia, Turkey and Iran launched in Astana in January 2. They should also open communication lines with non jihadist foes in order to discuss mutually acceptable decentralisation to enable local governance in opposition controlled areas without paving the way for Syrias breakup and to ease tit for tat restrictions on the besieged villages of Madaya, Zabadani, Fouaa and Kefraya. Likewise, they should press President Bashar Assad to negotiate a political settlement and should refrain from new offensives and collective punishment of civilians. In return, a negotiated settlement must take into account the partys vital interests, over which it shows neither willingness nor need to compromise given its fighting prowess. These include its arms channel, protecting Shiite shrines in Syria and preventing attacks against both the Shiite community and its fighters in Lebanon. Though the partys arsenal has long posed serious concerns inside and outside Lebanon, its disarmament cannot be linked to a negotiated Syria settlement if a deal is to have a chance. At the same time, Hizbollah should work to dispel domestic rivals fears by agreeing to resume dialogue on a defensive strategy stalled by its Syria intervention that would regulate its arsenals use, including its stated commitment not to use it against domestic foes or provoke war with Israel. None of this will be easy, but the alternative would be worse, for Hizbollah and much of the region a prolonged, ever costlier engagement in an unwinnable war of attrition. Beyond the human costs, Hizbollah would have to permanently mobilise a Shiite community whose patience and support may have limits, and recruit youths who lack the commitment and discipline that have made Hizbollah a formidable fighting force. It cannot relish that prospect. BeirutBrussels, 1. March 2. 01. 7I. Introduction. Hizbollah, a product of Israels 1. Lebanon invasion and occupation, owes its popularity and growth to its championing of Lebanese Shiites cause without presenting itself as a sectarian actor. Since the 1. 99. 0 end of the civil war, it has played a dual role of political party within the Lebanese system and Islam based armed resistance movement confronting Israel. However, the 2. 01. Syrian uprising and subsequent civil war there compelled it to shed its predominantly Lebanese profile for an unabashedly Shiite one by projecting its power across the border and thrusting itself into a sectarian coloured regional power struggle. Though Hizbollah had been active outside Lebanon previously, it appears to have extended its reach to include Syria, Iraq and Yemen, though the depth of its involvement in those countries remains a matter of speculation. As a Lebanese observer said, it is the regional arena, countries like Syria and Yemen, that has really become important to many of my Hizbollah interlocutors. Lebanon seems to be secondary in their discussions.